

Plato and True Names

The Foundations of General Schemas Theory

Kent D. Palmer, Ph.D.

P.O. Box 1632
Orange CA 92856 USA
714-633-9508
kent@palmer.name

Copyright 2004 K.D. Palmer.
All Rights Reserved. Not for distribution.
Started 04.08.12; Version 0.8; 04.08.16; gst05a08.doc

Keywords: General Schemas Theory, Systems Engineering, Systems Theory,

True Names

We have established in the last essay that Plato has opened up the difference between Logos and Physis through the exploration of the meta-levels of Being. We have expanded on this opening with our hypothesis concerning the quality of the relation between physis¹ and logos at each meta-level taking our queue from the schema of the system. But we went beyond this and asked what the chiasmic relations between the two duals might be and in that we discovered that the schema was the opposite of logic at the first meta-level. Thus when we ask about the logos of logos we get the rules of grammar. When we ask about the physis of physis we get the laws of physics. But when we ask about the physis of logos then we get logic. And when we ask of the logos of physis we get the schemas. The schemas are the embodiment of the physical things in spacetime, according to dimensionality, but with an emergent organization at each level, so that the schemas are not the same as the

¹ I use the word physis for phusis so that readers will relate it to physics with out having to retranslate in their heads continually.

dimensions but their dual. In effect it is the Pascal simplicies that generate dimensionality by generating the minimal solid of each dimension. If we look at the second table concerning the chiasms or reversibilities then we see that at the first meta-level there is the schemas which are the dual of the dimensions generated from the minimal solids at each level of the pascal triangle. But when we go to the second meta-level we see that there is causality, and we can see that in the unfolding of the Pascal Simplicies as well because each line by addition produces the next line by a rule. And when we go to the third meta-level we see there the bits which are the physical basis for the coding, and it turns out that the Pascal Triangle produces the minimal systems of bit arrays associated with Boolean Logic and Algebra which are used as the basis for our computers. Moving up to the fourth meta-level we find there anomalies and it turns out that when we generate the negative pascal triangle that is the dual of the positive Pascal triangle then after passing beyond the Pascal point, there is the void of odd zero, and then the negative Pascal point of the negative triangle which is composed of the hyper-complex algebras. This singularity is generated by running the Pascal triangle generation backwards and thus the triangle produces the singularity which is the biggest anomaly in mathematics giving rise to the complex and hyper complex numbers. If we go to the fifth meta-level we hit the externality of Being with respect to the physis and this we also see in the Pascal triangle in the articulation of the negative Pascal triangle as a whole unfolding from the singularity of the negative Pascal point. That negative triangle of hyper complex algebras in negative dimensionality is an image of existence rather than Being, so that with that image we leave the purview of Being all together. Existence is outside of Being and thus from existence we see the projection of Being, i.e. the positive Pascal triangle as a whole as separate from the interpenetration of existence. So from this perspective all the moments of the chiasm of physis with logos refers to the Pascal triangle which embodies all the aspects of the higher levels of

schematization.

We would expect the same thing to be the case on the side of logic with its chiasm with physis. Logic appears as the chiasm of the physis of the logos. Logic creates hard constraints of sensibility within language, we take these hard constraints to be built into language as a natural thing. But the core of logic is implication which we see at meta-level two. Whatever logic we are discussing be it standard or deviant there must be implication if there is to be a logic. Something must follow from previous statements. The weakest form of this kind of implication is Aristotle's enthymeme. If we go up to the third meta-level beyond the implication we have the production of codes. There can be no logic without the production of codes. These are assigned to bits in the coding and decoding process. But the production of the symbols to be coded is a necessary precursor to the creation of logical systems. At the fourth meta-level we see the exceptions appear. Exceptions do not fall under the system of logic, but also these include the Gödel statements that cannot be determined to be inside or outside the logical system. If you include the Gödel statements with the system you get emergent effects. If you exclude them and make them part of the meta-systemic environment of the system then you have de-emergence. When we move up to the fifth meta-level we have the externality of language itself, there are myriad languages generated by various cultures around the world. It seems that these grammars are instituted by the children who produce the basis of the language. This can be seen in the production of various creoles. Children produce the synthesis of language through their communicative interaction. But there are myriad possible architectures for language and the languages exclude those who do not know the language. So we get the very important point for Socrates to which he appeals in the *Cratylus* to a foreign tongue at several points in the dialogue. A genuine emergence in language is the arising of a new language. Within languages then there are new codes being created as symbols, then there are new

grammars with their implications, and finally there is the production of language itself that has an associated field of logics associated with it that determines the distinction between sense and non-sense at the furthest extreme in arguments. But as is known by all logicians you can still say a lot of non-sense with logically correct arguments. That is where the rhetorical modes come in to the picture. The rhetorical modes are another way of looking at the schemas in terms of language, and what language can say about things which lends another level of control over non-sense. If we speak in a certain rhetorical mode then there are specific controls on what can be said in that rhetorical mode which makes sense. What we say about the things at some level of rhetorical rigor concerns what the things say to us about themselves by their merely being or acting in the world. Their speech is perfectly self-reflexive in the sense that what they are is what they say to us. And then our speech about the things responds to what they are and based on what presents itself to us then certain things to say make sense and others do not make sense within our intersubjective cohort, i.e. the polis. This is something like what Socrates means when he talks about true speech. True speech responds to the nature of the things as they present themselves in Being, that is as they are in their essences, what Aristotle calls their substance. What they are in their essences is not something we make up, but something that exerts an external pressure on us. What we say about them responds to that external pressure and therefore we can tell if the things are real and if what we say about them is true by testing the properties of things in our actions, and by verifying the properties of things and what we said in our speeches about them. True speech is a response to the otherness of things, and that response in its highest form can be a response to the otherness of other people in other cities. That is why foreign languages is a limiting condition on the one hand. But on the other hand the material of the speech, i.e. the sounds may be different in the speech of the others, and this is what makes most people think that assignment of meaning is totally arbitrary, i.e. the fact that different languages

not only use different words but also different sets of sounds to build up those words. What Socrates says is that these differences of sounds and differences of words respond to the differences of things in the same way regardless of the language. This is a difficult proposition to argue for and Socrates knows it. Much of his work in the etymologies is attempting to find a way to establish this linkage between the phonemes and the things themselves. The only way it is possible is to establish the various levels of physis and logos and to say that there are resonances in the chiasmic relations between the duals at each meta-level. It is through these resonances that we establish a secret link to the things themselves by which we hear their voices despite the fact that our voices naming them overwhelm them.

However we have pushed our thesis further by noting that on the physis side it is the Pascal simplicities that provide the basis for the various meta-levels of the chiasm of logos over physis. Thus we might expect that there would be something similar on the language side where physis is over logos, that is similar to the triangle of Pascal. The only thing that I know of that is close to providing a similar single structure that unites all the meta-levels of the chiasm on the logos side is the Matrix Logic of August Stern. Matrix Logic is a deviant meta-logic that combines matrix mathematics with logic, by using truth vectors with matrices to represent logical operators. Until I can find other examples of the same kind of unification across meta-levels, I will attempt to use the Matrix Logic as a basis for fulfilling on the side of logos the same role that the Pascal triangle does on the side of physis. So if we start off at the first meta-level we would see that there is logic itself of which there are many different kinds, both traditional and deviant. Matrix Logic is a particular deviant logic that follows the nuances of Matrix Mathematics as a means of structuring the logic. So at the first meta-level we would posit the Matrix Logic itself as the embodiment of an advanced logic structured by a particular mathematical category. In

category theory it is the topos that is the mathematical category that is related to logics. Thus Matrix Logic is a combination of a topos and the category of matrix mathematics. This is similar to what happens in schema theory where there is a connection between dimensionality and the schemas themselves which are emergent levels that are different from the dimensions. The Pascal triangle is a mathematical object that defines the dimensions, but also defines the minimum sets of differences in anything. Thus if we are going to represent anything the basis of that representation would be the 2^n systems produced by the Pascal triangle. So on the one hand we have the dimensional and the schemas connected by the Pascal triangle, and on this other end we have the connection of the topos and the matrix categories that produce a logic organized by matrices. At any rate when we move up to the second meta-level we find implication as the key concept at the heart of logic. In terms of Matrix Logic implication is one of the sixteen operators and those operators form a system of complementary and dual operations that perform all the work of logic including implication. What this is saying is that instead of reducing to And, Not and implication which is the minimal set from which all logics can be built, we must consider the operators that function as matrices as a system. These operators work on the truth vectors which can represent not just true and false but also both and neither values as well. The operators as a whole provide the context within which implication works. Instead of a minimal system of operators that we might see in normal logical theory, there is a complete set of operators that give us all the various logical operations necessary for a complete system. When we move up to the third meta-level this is where symbol production occurs and this is where coding occurs which must be based on intelligibility. It is symbol production that makes the arguments constrained by the logic make sense or not. The truth values are assigned to the symbols and thus symbol production is not contained within logic itself. It is this level where Socrates says that phonemes are created that conform to the

things. Matrix Logic does not tell us how to do symbol production. But it does have a feature not encountered in ordinary logics that does appear at this level. That feature is that fact that operators can not just operate on truth values but also on other operators. Thus operators can form autopoietic rings and produce self-referential results. Operators operating on operators is similar to Socrates' talk about names being instruments for naming, as well as being names themselves. Matrix Logic operators are not just instruments for manipulating truth values but also they are instruments against each other. This is very much like the analogy of the weaving where the woven threads operate on each other, but this means the system is operating on itself, so the knot becomes an image of self-organization when it acts against itself to form a pattern. Matrix Logic does this with its operators and that is what makes it operate at the third meta-level. If we look at the computational table in which the operations of operators on themselves are captured we will see that there are some illegal operations. That is where we see the exceptions that appear at meta-level four. The operators are not completely fluid in their interoperation among themselves but there are some illegal operations and that is captured in the matrix of operator on operator results outlined by August Stern in his book Matrix Logic. In terms of meta-level five we can see the matrix logic as a whole, and we can apply it to more than just truth but to all the aspects of Being, i.e. reality, identity and presence as well. If we apply it to all the different aspects of Being then we might call that a Vajra logic. The Vajra logic treats the whole of Being. But its externality becomes the fact that the different aspects are all treated but orthogonally. In other words every symbol that is given an aspect value must have four vectors associated with it instead of one. That makes each symbol the nexus of a minimal system which represents all the aspects of Being. If we think of symbols as a nexus of Vajra logic values that give all the different aspects of being then we can understand why Socrates is concerned with the assignment of the thing with the phoneme, in other words the

phoneme or combination of phonemes that make up the word is a bearer for the four aspect vectors that assign the aspect of Being to any thing. We continually use phonemes as variables, i.e. as stand-ins for unknown values. Thus a phoneme can be seen as a variable with specified aspect values in all four dimensions of Being. When this is assigned to the thing it specifies its being precisely with respect to its standing toward the aspects. Thus any given thing can have a standing in Being assigned to it by the naming process. Let me name something $X^{[T][Rr][Pp][Ii]}$ where the capital letter indicates the aspect and the small letter can be either 2 = $^{[1,1]}$, 1 = $^{[1,0]}$, 0 = $^{[0,0]}$, or -1 = $^{[0,1]}$ of the possible vector values. When we assign a phoneme then we have assigned a variable to a thing and thus specified its Being. But then that variable to be specified then that is done by a combination of phonemes within the space of possible phoneme ranges. That selection is based in most cases on the similarity of the meaning of a phoneme combination with other phoneme combinations already assigned. See What's in a Word? Studies in Phonosemantics by Margaret Magnus². In other words Socrates believes that there is some meaning in the phonemes. That meaning is very diffuse and ambiguous, but it is specified when we combine phonemes together. These combinations produce clusters in the field of all possible phoneme combinations and these clusters many times have like meaning associated with them. If we think of the practice of assigning a variable and then filling in a variable as the way that names for things are established, then the variable would be the phoneme most like the other meanings in the field of possible phoneme assignments of meaning, but that assignment would be very diffuse. As other phonemes are added to specify the concept further then we get more and more precise meaning differentiation based on the combinatorics of the phonemes in relation to all the other preassigned phonemes that delineate the field. With this we can get an idea of what is meant by Socrates when he

² <http://www.trismegistos.com/Dissertation/>

says that the name represents the essence of the thing in its Being. What is meant is that a phenomena is assigned a variable with aspect assignments that reflect the Being of the thing. Then that variable is filled in with other phonemes from the field of possible phonemes until it is completely picked out and isolated. The variable itself as a phoneme has a very wide and indeterminate reference, but as phonemes are added then the reference becomes very determinate within the diacritical field. All words we have are merely articulations of this field. Many times the meaning is purely referential, but when the reference is weak then the phonosematics takes over to fill in meaning based on the indeterminate meaning of the phonemes coming from their prior use to articulate the field of meanings. The point is that in this scenario the assignment of Vajra logical values comes first and the essence of the thing is specified in terms of its standing in relation to being via the aspects. That orthogonality of the aspects is the way that the externality of Being appears. Thus it can be said under this scenario for making sense of what Socrates is saying that the name articulates the things being completely by specifying its standing in relation to the aspects in terms of its vector values. Phenomenologically it might be important to specify the standing in Being with respect to its aspects prior to the articulation of an isolated meaning. Once the standing in Being is identified then we can go about isolating the meaning by specifying other phonemes to fill in the variable phoneme. The discreteness of the meaning will only be in relation to the other meanings already created in the field of possible meanings. But that will bring out the true being of the thing because of the Vajra logic aspect vectors attached to the name not through the auspices of the name itself.

As you can see it is possible to think of Matrix Logic as fulfilling the same role as the Pascal Triangle does on the schema side now on the logic side of the chiasm. Matrix Logic gives us a means to walk up the ladder of the meta-levels and tie them all together. There may be

other viable means of doing the same thing but this is the only example I know of at the moment that I can use to balance the Pascal Triangle in the generation of the various meta-levels of the chiasmus. Notice both are quasi-mathematical. Both provide mathematical structure that organizes things beyond the realm of mathematics. And both work together well in the sense that the Pascal triangle provides the hyle or matter out of which the symbols are manufactured and their differences are inscribed for later reading. Matrix Logic provides us with a view of a system of meta-logic that when augmented with the concept of covering all the aspects of Being in a Vajra logic we then get a complete model of Being as articulated logically and then applied to representative matter. So what we have is a model or simulation of how the projection process works that Socrates is exploring that is much more specific than his own representation. Having such a hypothesis is very important if we want to advance our understanding past that of Socrates, by understanding what he is talking about and then going beyond it. This is the definition of understanding articulated by Heidegger. Understanding must be a going beyond the information given. In the last essay we did that by constructing a model of the interface between logos and physis. Here we are doing that by showing that there are structures in mathematics that can be used to organize the structures of logic or the schemas in order to show that the various meta-levels work together. In all this the connection back to the mathematical framework of the Pascal triangle or the matrices is very important. This is the impingement of nomos or order on the physis and logos. Nomos is a non-dual that comes in to organize and to relate the various aspects of the physis and logos and ultimately make possible their resonance and coordination. On the logos side we have orthogonality represented by the matrices at the core of our logical meta-system. That orthogonality has a group structure as we can see in the work of Shea Zellweger in his Logic Alphabet³. Matrix

³ <http://www.logic-alphabet.net/>

Logic formalizes that group structure and uses matrix mathematics to maintain the structure. On the other hand, Pascal's Triangle and other Simplicies has the properties of the special systems all together in a single mathematical object which is reflexive, autopoietic and dissipative all at once. This mathematical object of the Pascal simplicies stands in as the variable natural object which gives us the Hyle onto which to project the symbolic differences that appear as intelligible. The logical variable is projected on this embodiment variable, the assignments of the aspects are part of that projection first. But after that then the variable is specified by adding phonemes and producing the combinatorial space of all possible words out of which the real words are a small clustered subset. When the embodiment variable of the Pascal triangle which represents mere existence, is filled then we get the schematization of the object that is filling the variable. That schematization comes with the projection of dimensionality in spacetime on the eventivity that is being embodied in the variable. The variable itself is prue information differentiation. But when the variable is occupied by something then this information differentiation is used as the hyle to provide the basis for the coding. First there is schematization, then there is the determination of kind by categorization, and then there is the determination of individual features and uniquenesses that eventually leads to the specification of the meaning of the thing that has been embodied. The projected schematization is in the form of Pascal's triangle which stands as a embodiment variable. The symbolic variable is projected on that embodiment variable and can be given complete specification in terms of the aspects of Being in a Vajra Logic. But then the embodiment variable can be occupied just as the logical variable can be occupied. The occupation of the logical variable specifies the meaning in the diacritical field. The occupation of the embodiment variable results in schematization and dimensionalization of the thing that appears from the physus. The various higher meta-levels on both the side of logos and physus come in to play as necessary

for each state of affairs.

What we see here in this hypothesis concerning the unification of the meta-levels of chiasm on the physus-logos side and on the logos-physus side is that we can now begin to understand what is meant by the naming instrument being the same as the name. The naming instrument is the variable, represented by a phoneme with its aspect values specified that is projected on the universal embodiment variable of the Pascal triangle. The Pascal triangle represents generic hyle, or matter, that is codable in bits. That is like a surrogate for the matter of the physus. This projection of the surrogate matter appears at one level as the schemas related to dimensionality, at another level it is causality, at another level it is the bit systems 2^n for possible encoding, at another level it is the anomalies that disturb our projections, at another level it is the externality of the otherness of the thing itself as noumena. The noumena as emergent event enters into the projected embodiment variable step by step considering on how close it is to a genuine emergence. First it appears as the emergent externality, then it appears as the anomalies that disturb the autopoietic reflexive dissipative projection of the embodiment variable. Then it appears as causality which is what Socrates calls natural, which are constraints that cannot be violated if we are to cut the phenomena along its joints, i.e. encounter it non-nihilistically. Then it appears as schematized by its dimensionality, then it appears to us as physus, which has laws, which has parts that are discriminable, which has anomalies that are discernable, which then appears as an external reality. What we are seeing here is the articulation of our dreaming consciousness. Our consciousness is continually dreaming. But in waking our dreaming consciousness is articulated by the disturbances from our sensations. The thing enters along the line of the logos-physus chiasm and rebounds to produce an external world along the unfolding physus meta-levels. When the emergent eventivity enters along the chiasmic pathway of logos-physus then it fills in the embodiment variable and this

articulation of that variable allows the filling in of the variable producing an assignment that will give a reference meaning to the object. This rebound into consciousness of the emergent eventuality allows the name to be given as the instrument of the naming, i.e. the phonemic variable, is filled in with a word. That word comes from the categorization of the phenomena. First there must be a schematization that occurs on the logos-physus side, but once the eventuality is schematized then it can be assigned a kind. If that kind already exists then that assignment is given, but otherwise a new name must be coined, and a new categorization performed. Once the categorization has occurred and the kind determined then we can see the unique attributes of that thing, and finally we can give it meaning in the semantic web. In this way we can see that Socrates is right to say that the name is both the instrument of naming and the name itself. But these are at two different moments. However the two moments are bound together in the relation between the chiasma that will connect the two at the Hyper Being level which is the realm of intelligibility. Names become true names through the articulation of the embodiment variable and then the categorization that leads to a naming within consciousness based on a categorization of the phenomena that appears when the embodiment variable is filled in. Naming fills in the phoneme variable which has its aspects specified. The truth of the name is dependent on the filling in of the embodiment variable by the emergent eventuality. After that is filled in it is the basis of the completed projection of the external real ontic world within the meta-levels of physus itself.

Our account of how the name as instrument ~~is~~ the name, i.e. in difference⁴, is a development of the chiasm between physus and logos and attempts to articulate how these meta-levels on either side of the chiasm are unified by the pascal triangle and the Matrix Logic. Matrix logic represents the orthogonality of the aspects when interpreted as a Vajra Logic.

⁴ cf Derrida

Matrix logic gives us a way to compute the relations of the aspect values logic in four orthogonal logical systems. On the other hand the Pascal simplicies represent the embodiment variable, and one if its modes is scheatization which is based on dimensionalization. The Pascal Simplicies is a mathamtical figure that has the properties of the three special systems combined. But there is a certain fusion in the Pascal Simplicies that is unique but which is the dual of the orthogonality of the Vajra Logic. But one of the modes of the Pascal Triangle is to produce orthogonal geometrical dimensionality which is the dual of schematization. Thus there is ortogonality on both sides. What is like the Pascal Triangle on the side of the chiasm that emphasizes Logos is the concept of Being itself. The Pascal Triangle as an embodiment of the characteristics of the special systems fused is a representation of existence. Thus the relation between Logos and Physus here is a surrogate for the relation between Being and Existence. We project a paradigm of existence, which is articulated by the things that are found, and these are taken up into Being to fill out the projection. Thus the meta-levels of the chiasm are related to existence while the meta-levels of the chiasm on the physus side are related to the projection of Being. It is about this projection of Being in the meta-levels of the physus that we speak using the meta-levels of the Logos. But that logos is constrained by logic, and Matrix Logic gives us a full logic to deal with the various aspects of Being. We using that logic about the aspects of Being to project the phonemic variable onto the embodiment variable. The embodiment variable is filled in by the emergent eventuality and then in response we fill in the name of the thing into the phonemic variable. At that point we have a thing and a name, with both variables filled in. It is a true name to the extent that the emergent eventuality articulated though its anomalies the embodiment variable provided by Pascal's triangle and that perturbation is reflected in the exceptions related to the filling out of the name variable with respect to the referential totality of names and their supporting categorizations. A true

name is really a name aligned with all the aspects of Being, i.e. it is also a real name, an identical name and a present name. Each of these aspects play off of their opposites, i.e. difference, absence, illusion, and fiction. These opposites are neglected by the Western Tradition and they have been under taboo for millennia. But Deleuze has begun to delve into this taboo liminality within our tradition and show that they are necessary to understand as their opposites, because these are the surrogates of otherness within Being. We could say instead of the True name, the Aspectival Name. The Aspectival name is the name that gives the standing of the thing in relation to Being. The Aspectival name is what conveys the semblance of the fact that the thing has an persistent essence that is autonomous and independent of us. But that persistence of the essence is really an articulation of the second meta-level of Being where we articulate rules which constrain the attributes of things. The persistent independent essence is just as much a part of our projection on to the existence of the things themselves as the names we give those essences through our categorizations. But there is something more basic than the determination of kinds and that is the schematization of the thing into a specific schema. We have used the system schema as our example in our exploration of naming, but any of the schemas could have been used. Schemas are organizations of things that are emergent but tied to the differentiation of dimensions. Something must first appear in spacetime before it can be categorized as a certain kind of thing. The schema is that first encounter of the thing with the projected spacetime that overflows from us in our projection of the world and the other schemas. From the schematization we can move toward understanding the kind of thing we are dealing with once the spacetime articulation is understood. Then we can move on to identifying the specific and unique properties of the individual as it rises above the set and mass approaches to things, and finally we can find a place in our webs of meaning that will give the thing its relevance and significance.

A Continuation of the Reading of the Cratylus

In the last chapter Hermogenes had rejected the way of Protagoras and rejected Socrates' suggestion that he learn with him. So Socrates goes on to give another suggestion . . .

[Soc.] Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets.

[Her.] And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does he say?

[Soc.] He often speaks of them; notably and nobly in the places where he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to the same things. Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about the correctness of names? For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call things by their right and natural names; do you not think so?

[Her.] Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at all. But to what are you referring?

[Soc.] Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a single combat with Hephaestus? Whom the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander.

[Her.] I remember.

[Soc.] Well, and about this river- to know that he ought to be called Xanthus and not Scamander- is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the bird which, as he says, The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis: to be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis is than the name Cymindis- do you deem that a light matter? Or about Batieia and Myrina? And there are many other observations of the same kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the understanding of you and me;

In the search for the true names Socrates turns next after Protagoras to Homer, a venerable source in the Greek tradition. Homer distinguishes between the names the gods use for things and the things that men use for them. What are called the gods in Greece are later called the jinn among the Muslims who inherited the Greek culture and preserved it. In other words they are invisible intelligent creatures like men. Of course, we have no objective evidence such creatures exist, but they are attested in the mythology in historical cultures world wide. It makes sense that we might project invisible intelligences onto nature as an explanation of natural events in lieu of physical explanations. Thus when we speak of the gods we are probably talking about pure projections of ourselves onto nature and natural phenomena. But these projections within the reflexive social structure take on a

life of their own. In a paper⁵ on Jung and Nietzsche I have written on the fact that archetypes are the dual and opposite of ideas. Ideas are present and identical unities and archetypes are absent and different totalities. The gods as interpreted by Jung are archetypes, i.e something like universal structures that come out in our projections on to other people and things. When we realize that the archetypes are the complementary opposites of the ideas then we see that it is significant that Socrates begins to talk about them at this point in the Cratylus dialogue. What is interesting about what Socrates says based on Homer is that these archetypal projections have their own names for things different from human names. The archetypes are a perfect example of the part of our unconscious or subconscious projections that take on a life of their own. The projection ecstasy is a highly energetic stream that is overflowing from dasein in the production of the world and the other schemas. We know from Prigogine that in highly energetic streams there can be produced negatively entropic orders. Special systems Theory tells us that these negatively entropic dissipative structures can interact to produce stable autopoietic structures and then reflexive social structures. One way to think about the gods as those negentropic zones in our own projection stream. We might say that they live in the realm between consciousness and superconsciousness, where superconsciousness is defined as the dream state. One of their dissipative ordering structures is in consciousness and the other one is in superconsciousness. That is to say that they live across the boundary of normal waking consciousness and the dream state. We know that the dream state is the core of consciousness all the time. So it makes sense that on that boundary there could be dissipative autopoietic reflexive structures. But wait we said above that the Pascal triangle acting as an embodiment variable combined the properties of the autopoietic, reflexive and dissipative special systems. Thus the gods could be an

image of these embodiment variables. They are nodes in our consciousness where there is stable and reflexive ordering going on. They are experienced as the hither to unknown others that we meet in our dreams. Our dreams introduce us to inhuman others that inhabit dream universes. In our dream states things can happen that cannot happen in physical reality, like flying. Thus the dream state has superconscious properties that do not exist in the normal waking state. So if we follow this logic and see that Socrates is talking about what we have called the embodiment variables when he talks about the gods, then we can begin to see that it is significant if these embodiment variables have different names than we have for the same thing. They are names that express difference, absence and totality rather than the opposite which are names that express ideas which express identity, presence and unity that are the hallmark of logocentrism. What are these names given by the archetypes rather than ourselves?

When we confront the world through our senses the senses perturb the dreams of consciousness to produce the world as we know it in waking life. But at the core of consciousness there is always the dreaming going on which is the core of the world production ecstasy within us that overflows our dasein. Those perturbations of our dreaming that makes it appear that there is an external reality during the day when we are awake are different and speak of absences, and represent totalities of experience. Thus there must be something in consciousness that responds to that otherness beyond us within us. I would like to suggest that this otherness within ourselves that responds to the otherness outside ourselves are the archetypes. The archetypes appear as reflexive autopoietic dissipative systems within the energy stream of our own projections process. But then they operate as embodiment variables for external things, and at the height of that is the external embodiment of other people. Those other people have names that they were given external to us and our influence. We ourselves have such names. But we take away those

⁵ Idea, Essence, Existence and Archetype (On Nietzsche, Jung and others) see <http://archonic.net/ia00V03.pdf>

names and give them nicknames ourselves. Cratylus would take away the given name of Hermogenes and give him a nick name which he is reticent to pronounce. Cratylus in all probability took away the original name of Plato and gave him the name Plato instead. What is suggested here is the the true name known by the gods is a name that appears out of our own unconscious as an archetypal name and that the true name supplants the conventional nicknames that we give to things that we experience ourselves. If those unconsciously assigned names are Aspectival names then they address the staning that the thing has in Being. What is interesting is that in dreaming all the aspects are applicable just like they are in waking states. However the difference is that in dreaming there is a chiasmic modulation of one aspect by the other. We can use the Diamond logic of Hellerstein to address this. Hellerstein says that we can speak of *A yet B* which is **I** or *B yet A* which is **J**. These are the two “imaginary” variables of G. Spencer-Brown that he talks about in *Laws of Form*. Hellerstein has figured out how this imaginary logic works and calls it a Diamond Logic. The two “imaginary” logical values are the paradoxical nodes that are inverses of each other that approximate the positive and negative infinities away from the duality being posited in each case. So when we apply this Diamond logic to dreaming then we realize that dreaming has the chisasmic aspects of illusory yet real, fictional yet true, absent yet present, and different yet identical which is the **I** vanishing point. When we come from dream into waking consciousness then the aspects separate out and gain their distinctness and non-paradoxicality. But interestingly there is also the logocentric world that is an illusion that we create in our projections which is the **J** vanishing point. In the logocentric world we have identical yet different, present yet absent, real yet illusory, true yet fictional. This is the manifestation of the writing body rather than the dream body. This is the production of the ideal world which is the dual of the archetypal world. In the ideal world we constitute a projected a unified real, true, identical and present ream of ideas that we

project beyond ourselves as the physus. But that world is based on the implicit dream world at the core of consciousness which is a totalized illusory, fictional, different and absent world of archetypes. But the archetypes act as the receptors and the responsive nodes which allow the voice of the other to be heard. When we bring the dream body and the writing body together then we produce anamorphs that are both **I/J** and **J/I** at the same time. The anamorphs contain the aspectival name from the dream world and the conventional name from the waking world. In Socrates practice there is an attempt to archeologically unearth the vestages of the absent “true” name assigned by the unconscious from the presence of the conventional name. It is assumed that we can decode the conventional name and by changing the letters appropriately find the “true” name, i.e. the archetypal name. Socrates next gives an example of this sort of archeology.

but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax, which he affirms to have been the names of Hector's son, are more within the range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think; and what the poet means by correctness may be more readily apprehended in that instance: you will remember I dare say the lines to which I refer?

[Her.] I do.

[Soc.] Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of the names given to Hector's son- Astyanax or Scamandrius?

[Her.] I do not know.

[Soc.] How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the unwise are more likely to give correct names?

[Her.] I should say the wise, of course.

[Soc.] And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the wiser?

[Her.] I should say, the men.

[Soc.] And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him Astyanax (king of the city); but if the men called him Astyanax, the other name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the women.

[Her.] That may be inferred.

[Soc.] And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than their wives?

[Her.] To be sure.

[Soc.] Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for the boy than Scamandrius?

[Her.] Clearly.

[Soc.] And what is the reason of this? Let us consider:- does he not himself suggest a very good reason, when he says, For he alone defended their city and long walls? This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour king of the city which his father was saving, as Homer observes.

[Her.] I see.

[Soc.] Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you?

[Her.] No, indeed; not I.

[Soc.] But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his name?

[Her.] What of that?

[Soc.] The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of Astyanax- both are Hellenic; and a king (anax) and a holder (ektor) have nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king; for a man is clearly the holder of that of which he is king; he rules, and owns, and holds it. But, perhaps, you may think that I am talking nonsense; and indeed I believe that I myself did not know what I meant when I imagined that I had found some indication of the opinion of Homer about the correctness of names.

[Her.] I assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to be on the right track.

[Soc.] There is reason, I think, in calling the lion's whelp a lion, and the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordinary course of nature, when an animal produces after his kind, and not of extraordinary births;- if contrary to nature a horse have a calf, then I should not call that a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a natural birth. And the same may be said of trees and other things. Do you agree with me?

[Her.] Yes, I agree.

Socrates interestingly enough assigns one of the names of Hector's son to the men and one to the women. This gender division stands for the division between consciousness and the unconscious. But here Socrates rejects the name assigned by the women and concentrates on the name assigned by the men. Then he says that king and holder are very similar and that because Hector is the defender of the city he deserves to be called possessor of that city and his son deserves to be called a king after him and like him. But in fact Hector loses the city and his son never becomes king. So there is irony here. The name assigned to the women is the archetypal name. In this case Scamandrius is a nickname used by the father to name the son. So Astyanax is the conventional name and Scamandrius is the nickname after the River Scamander⁶. "Scamander was an Oceanid, son of Oceanus and Tethys. By Idaea, he fathered Teucer. Scamander fought on the side of the Greeks during the Trojan War"⁷. In the Iliad the River Scamander blocks a Trojan Retreat and thus helps Achilles to kill many Trojans just before

⁶ (skmn´dr) (KEY) , ancient name of the Küçük Menderes River, c.60 mi (95 km) long, NW Turkey. It flows W and NW from the Kaz Dai through the Troas into the Mediterranean Sea. It is frequently mentioned in the Iliad. See <http://www.bartleby.com/65/>

⁷ <http://www.fact-index.com/s/sc/scamander.html>

the point where Achilles fights and kills Hector. So the son of Hektor is named after a local river which in fact fights as a god on the side of the Achaeans rather than on the side of the Trojans. Hector prays⁸ just before battle that his son be a better man than him. But his prayer is not answered, and both Hector and the boy dies. It is a picture of human fate at its most poignant. Socrates has taken the prayer and the part where Hector asks of Zeus that his son be made king of Troy as the basis of his relating the name of the father to the name of the son. If we read carefully here between the lines we can infer that what is important here is the prayer to the gods, concerning the boy. The father uses his nickname for the boy in the prayer not the conventional name known by the whole city. So the nickname in this case is closer to the reality of the boy, and is the name that the gods would know him by as his true name. That true name is taken after the river by river that is actually helping the Achaeans and in particular Achilles in his berserker rage. The river is a force of nature and the river is likened to Achilles berserk who is reduced to an animal or a force of nature himself. So the boy has the name of a force of nature not unlike the force that Hector will go up against and lose the fight too. The true name of the boy points to the fate of the father, to be destroyed by something like the force of nature in human form as Achilles. Both the father and the boy are betrayed in their fate like the river betrays its nearby city. The river like lust gone wild, is a pointer to the love of Helen by Paris

⁸ "Hector stretched his arms towards his son, but the boy cried and grabbed for his nurse, scared at the fierce sight of his father's armor and especially at the nodding horse-hair plume on Hector's helmet. Hector and Andromache laughed. And Hector took the gleaming helmet from his head and put it aside on the ground. Then he took his dear child, kissed him, and bounced him in his arms, all the while praying to Zeus and all the gods: "Grant, oh gods, that this boy, my son, with whom I am well pleased, may be like me--first in glory among the Trojans! Strong and brave like me, Hector, his father! And grant, oh gods, that Scamandrius, son of Hector, may one day rule all Ilium in power and glory. And grant that all men shall say, 'He is a better man than his father!'"

which overstepped the bounds and thus carried the whole city away. Paris betrayed his brother Hector and the whole city by abducting Helen and thus brining the Achaeans down on Troy. The reference of Socrates to this point in the story is very complex. The backstory does not at all point in the direction that Socrates indicates to Hermogenes. But what we can say is that the boy has a true name that can be offered in a prayer to the gods, it is the name that the gods are most likely to grant a favor based on, because it is the name that signifies the love of the boy by the father. But that name is betrayed because it is related to the river which has betrayed the city. Achilles and the river share the same mother Thetis and so that is what makes them allies. Blood runs thicker than water between the river god and Achilles. The River is double named and so is the boy named after the river. Xanthus is the name use for the river by the gods and Scamander is the name of the river used by men. A point that is worth mentioning is that the river can stand for the forces of nature in flux which will play a large part in later etymologies. Fate itself can be overwhelming to mere mortals. Nature is something that can overwhelm us. Yet, note also that Socrates shies away from talking about the physus of the river and again talks about a human being the son of Hector. This makes us again suspicious that the physus that is being discussed is that of human beings, i.e. those who are gifted with logos and not physical things. The key point is that both the boy and the river share the same name and that is the nickname given by the father not the conventional name. This name links the name of the river which is the public name to the name of the river assigned by the gods. Thus we get the following progression. Xanthes --- Scamander --- Astyanax. True name of the river is doubled with its public name which is the nickname of the boy which is doubled with his conventional name. The nick name of the boy is associated with women because the women of the household would have known the nickname of the boy used by his father. But it is a misstatement by Socrates that this is a name of the women as opposed to a name of the men. This is merely a way of

characterizing the hidden and private as opposed to the public. If we translate this sequence into our theory given above about archetypal names then we would have the archetypal name of the phenomena opposed to the conventional name of the phenomena. But then that conventional name of the phenomena is given to the boy as a nickname known by women of the household as opposed to the conventional name of the boy known by the whole city of men. If we take the first double naming as having to do with the embodiment variable and the second one having to do with the naming instrument variable then we can see that what is happening is a overlapping of the two. First the boy has a nickname that is only known in the household by the women given by the father. Then the boys name is linked to the outward name of the river. But the river has a true name that comes in to fill the embodiment variable represented by the boy. After that the boy is given a conventional name known by the men in the city. It is the name associated with the river that designates the fate of the boy and the father related to betrayal by Paris who is overwhelmed by desire and the overwhelming by Achilles when he is in a bezerker state which is when he is like a natural force like the river. The true name of the boy is the natural force that kills both his father and him. That is the name known by the gods the fated name. But that name is transferred to the boy by way of the conventional name for the river. That name is adopted by the father and is a secret name that signifies his love of the boy which is also like a natural force in human affairs. Hector prays for the boy using the nickname not the public name. The public name is the fond wish that his son will one day be king, but that cannot be because fate will overwhelm the boy and the father like a natural force engulfing them both. I take this naming sequence to be an image of the chiasmic overlapping of physus and logos. This chiasmic overlapping is played out by the overlapping of the names between the boy and the river. The true name of the river is the name known by the gods that holds the fate of the boy and the father. Conventional names represent our wishes that we offer up as

prayers to the gods but this cannot change fate or sway the intention of the gods to decree our world, to make our fate come true. True names are dangerous names.

Socrates says

nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a natural birth

The inhuman birth in this case is the two sons of Thetis Achilles and the River Scamander. Both Helen and Achilles around which the story of the Iliad revolves are Extraordinary births. These extraordinary births may be likened to emergent events. It is the emergent event that changes who we see things. In the case of the Iliad it is the advent of Glory. Human births as the birth of Hector's son must be judged in relation to the extraordinary births of emergent events. Emergent events are when the true names known by the Gods manifest themselves and are no longer covered up by the conventional names. That is when the archetypes appear and break up the illusions of continuity produced by ideas. This appearance of archetypes is like our hearing the voice of the things themselves. But we must have within ourselves a pinch of otherness in order to hear these alien voices of things as noumena. As Schopenhauer says we know the noumena as will within ourselves. Knowing ourselves as noumena gives us the ability to know other things as noumena. That is why the true names are assigned by the gods, from within us, and the variables are filled by other phonemes contributed by the unconscious to give the true name to the phenomena after the embodiment variable is filled by the perturbations of the anomalies of the things themselves as they interact with our projections.

[Soc.] Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not play tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is to be called a king. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or not the same, makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained; nor does the addition or subtraction of a letter make any difference so long as the essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and appears in it.

[Her.] What do you mean?

[Soc.] A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the names of letters, which you know are not the same as

the letters themselves with the exception of the four e, u, o (short), o (long); the names of the rest, whether vowels or consonants, are made up of other letters which we add to them; but so long as we introduce the meaning, and there can be no mistake, the name of the letter is quite correct. Take, for example, the letter beta- the addition of e, t, a, gives no offence, and does not prevent the whole name from having the value which the legislator intended- so well did he know how to give the letters names.

[Her.] I believe you are right.

This is the key point in the dialogue where Socrates develops the idea that extra letters do not matter, and this is what allows him to add and eventually subtract other letters in order to find the true name of the thing. Here we must go into a long discourse concerning number theory. This is because what Socrates is doing is hiding the relation between the phonemes and the special systems. Note that the point is that you can add extra letters without disturbing the meaning of a letter of the alphabet and that this naturally occurs in all cases but just four letters, all of which are vowels. This means it is for consonants that other letters are added normally. Vowels are perfect letters because they need no addition to them to articulate them. Now we need to look at number theory and see that in that theory there are perfect numbers, the parts of which add up to the number itself. All other numbers other than the perfect ones either have divisors that add up to more or less than the number itself. So perfect numbers are wholes exactly equal to the sum of its parts. The vowels mentioned are phonemes that need no additional articulation but are complete in themselves. There is a certain perfection in the vowels that do not need either added articulation by other phonemes, nor do we need to take anything away from them because they are unitary in themselves. If we study number theory there are other numbers called amicable and sociable that are like perfect numbers except that their being exactly equal to themselves occurs after a delay and by the mediation with other numbers. These three kinds of numbers (perfect, amicable and sociable) are images of the special systems. Thus they are images of the Pascal triangle and the variable of embodiment. So we can infer here that there is some inner connection between the phoneme when it is a vowel as the

variable of projection of the aspects of Being and the variable of embodiment which is related to the Pascal triangle. Socrates is pointing away from the special systems by stating his method is to add and subtract letters. But this is precisely what takes us away from the autonomy and independence of the phonemes themselves which is related to the special systems. The phonemes are special unities which cannot be broken down any further and out of which everything else is made. These unities can be combined to create names. But they are an image of the essences of the things in their unity. Socrates is pointing away from what he really thinks and this is what makes this a comedy. He really things that the phonemes are unities like perfect numbers that are holonomic and that things are holonomic as well and it is the resonance between these two holonomies that allow us to know the true names of the things by getting into synchrony with the things themselves through that part of ourselves that responds to their otherness, i.e. the archetypal part of ourselves.

Socrates is pointing is precisely the opposite direction than he would like us to look. By saying that it is OK to add and subtract letters he is taking us out onto the sea of language which is a meta-system, where everything is topsy turvy and all the meanings are up for grabs. No wonder he finds flux there as the fundamental meaning behind most names given by the ancient name-givers who we suspect are the pre-Socratic philosophers such as Heraclitus, the precursor to Cratylus himself. On the other hand the phoneme by itself exhibits an amazing persistence and autonomy or independence like the essence that is assumed to be in things. Presumably a true name is such that the parts add up to the whole like a perfect number. All other numbers that are not sociable and amicable are such that their parts add up to more or less than their whole. Thus they are not independent and autonomous like the perfect number and like the phoneme taken alone. Evidently the concept is that the phoneme has this amazing stability within the sea of changes of language,

and thus whatever meaning the phoneme has will be something you can count on. But unfortunately the phoneme's meaning is very diffuse based as it is on the punning and sound similarities that make use of the phoneme. The vowels are the most stable as they do not even need other letters to be sounded. Yet the vowels alone are unarticulated and amorphous.

Socrates suggests that . . .

And whether the syllables of the name are the same or not the same, makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained; nor does the addition or subtraction of a letter make any difference so long as the essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and appears in it.

. . . the addition or subtraction of letters done by accident do not detract from the essence of a thing. This recalls Aristotle's' idea of essences and accidents. The essential is that which is the same throughout all changes. Socrates is suggesting that the idea can remain the same even if the letters of the word that represents the idea change randomly or accidentally.

but so long as we introduce the meaning, and there can be no mistake, the name of the letter is quite correct.

It is the meanings that are stable and the letters in the words can change as long as there can be no mistake. And what makes the meanings stable, that must be the *forms*, those templates outside spacetime from which the things are made which are the ideals. But we now know that the ideal world is one where presence, identity, truth and reality reign in unity, which is the dual of the archetypal world. The phonemes that need no additional letters, which are vowels, approximate the stability of that world of source forms outside spacetime. That is why the phonemes can act as variables for the assignment of names, i.e. instruments of naming. And we say vowels with every word we say. They are articulated by consonants, and it is the consonants that need the support of other letters in their own names. So running throughout our speech are the vowels that are stable and independent, yet fluid because they augment the consonants. This sounds a lot like Being itself. The vowels are omnipresent. The

have the least difference from each other, because there are fewer vowels than consonants. The vowels are produced by the flows of air unarticulated and so they form the truest path through the mouth. It is the interaction between consonants and vowels that give reality to speech. That interaction is the testing of the vowels as the various articulations of the mouth impinge on the flow of air that creates the vowels. In other words in a fanciful sense the vowels can be seen as the fundamental element of speech to which all the other elements are added. And it brings with it the aspects of Being in their most primitive form to produce something that is independent and autonomous and can thus point toward the forms that are the foundation of meaning beyond the world.

[Soc.] And may not the same be said of a king? A king will often be the son of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble sire; and similarly the offspring of every kind, in the regular course of nature, is like the parent, and therefore has the same name.

Names should follow the course of nature, meaning the offspring should have the same name as the father. With respect to Hector and his son that true name held and evil fate. It is said that the son is the secret of the father. In this case the son's secret was the connection to the name of the river that betrayed its city and which like a force of nature destroyed indiscriminately in this case the good man, Hector and his son.

Yet the syllables may be disguised until they appear different to the ignorant person, and he may not recognize them, although they are the same, just as any one of us would not recognize the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell, although to the physician, who regards the power of them, they are the same, and he is not put out by the addition; and in like manner the etymologist is not put out by the addition or transposition or subtraction of a letter or two, or indeed by the change of all the letters, for this need not interfere with the meaning.

Now we get another metaphor which is very important. That is the metaphor of the physician. It is said that the physician like the etymologist can recognize the same drug though it appear of a different color and smell by its action. And this is what is meant *by nature* in as much as the action of nature has constancy. But it is interesting that the

etymologist is a pharmacologist which is related to the pharmakon, i.e. the one who is both healer and cursed, and who like Oedipus is rejected by the city in order to purify it of the plague. Throughout the dialogue there is the point being made that the likeness of Being is not the likeness of perception and that colors and smells do not establish the being of a thing. In other words the changes of letters are like the changes of perception which do not necessarily represent the true nature of a thing in itself due to the fact that there may be illusions. We can see here the logocentrism of Plato, in as much as he is saying that difference does not matter to identity at the level of meanings which is at the level of forms. The presence of the idea cannot be obscured by letter changes. The reality of the idea is greater than that of the perceptions that are subject to flux. The truth of the idea is not diminished by errors in transmission.

As was just now said, the names of Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, which is t, and yet they have the same meaning. And how little in common with the letters of their names has Archepolis (ruler of the city)- and yet the meaning is the same. And there are many other names which just mean "king." Again, there are several names for a general, as, for example, Agis (leader) and Polemarchus (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good warrior); and others which denote a physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and Acesimbrotus (curer of mortals); and there are many others which might be cited, differing in their syllables and letters, but having the same meaning. Would you not say so?

[Her.] Yes.

We don't need any letters at all in common to discover the meaning of things. This is what the nihilistic statement of Socrates really means. In other words this false etymology that we are led into are language games and that it is really our own intuition that guides our seeing the meanings encoded in language that we take as a guide, as for instance, Heidegger does with his false etymologies. A false etymology may have more truth in it than a true one. But Sedley says that the ancients did not distinguish true from false etymologies but instead they entered fully into the word games as a way to lead their thought through language to interesting conclusions. It is like a kind of archeology, that sees in similarity a pattern that can lead us to associate things that we normally would not associate, it is like

punning. For instance the word *tree* and *true* are related in old English. This suggests that the straightness of the *tree* led to the abstract concept of something being *true*. Since trees were sacred to the Northern Europeans then this infuses more meaning into the relation between trees and truth. It is a suggestive way of thinking that leads you down pathways that would not be normally taken that are interesting in themselves, because language itself twists the ways of thought thereby. Language has a role in thought and leads thought down its own byways. In this quote Socrates reveals the full nihilism of his method, since there does not have to be even one letter in common, then the etymologist is free to make up what ever relations strike his fancy as he sees invisible similarities between things that seem very different. But in a way the revelation of these invisibles is exactly where Being comes into play, and we see it in the warpages of the world where the meta-levels of Being are beheld.

[Soc.] The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow in the course of nature?

[Her.] Yes.

Socrates is beginning to differentiate between the norms and the exceptions which we found an important distinction when it came to the fourth meta-level of Being. Norms are established at the lower meta-levels of Being at levels one and two. Naming sometimes follows the norms. But sometimes they are violated by the exceptions.

[Soc.] And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and are prodigies? for example, when a good and religious man has an irreligious son, he ought to bear the name not of his father, but of the class to which he belongs, just as in the case which was before supposed of a horse foaling a calf.

[Her.] Quite true.

[Soc.] Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called irreligious?

[Her.] Certainly.

[Soc.] He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or Mnesitheus (mindful of God), or any of these names: if names are correctly given, his should have an opposite meaning.

[Her.] Certainly, Socrates.

We must contrast the exceptions to the rules. The science of Plato looks carefully at the

exceptions and tries to derive wisdom from them. The science of Aristotle attempts to look just at the norms and see them as the common man sees them. Thus the Science of Aristotle ignores the exceptions, that is why they come back and bite him and cause paradigm shifts. Plato's science is very different from this, instead it is the science of the special systems, of the anomalies themselves and their structures. Where there is "a horse foaling a calf" we must then look carefully at the structure of the anomaly itself in order to learn something about the world. And what we find is that structure has the structure of the Special Systems. So the difference that Socrates is making here is not accidental, rather he is making a distinction between the kind of science that merely looks at the norm like that of Aristotle and contrasting that with his kind of science of Anomalies. The science that looks at anomalies has no better target than the line of Agamemnon. In Socrates' opinion they are all rightly named. And so here we see the example of a series of rightly named fathers and sons who themselves acted against nature and thus were cursed. Here I will reverse the order to the mention of these names so that we can look at their stories and attempt to glean what we can from the exceptional births that Socrates is presenting to us.

NOTE: REVERSED SEQUENCE

(9) If I could remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more conclusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors of the Gods

This is an interesting statement because we know now that the Hittites had a God prior to Uranus called Alalu⁹. But this god does not appear in the Theogony of Hesiod. There is an interesting story about this god and his being deposed by Anu.

"Alalu(s)

He was the king in heaven in olden days and Anus was the first among the gods. Anus served as his cupbearer for 9 years before defeating him and dispatching him to under the earth."

"Anu(s) (Akkadian in origin)

While Alalus was king in heaven, Anus was more

⁹ <http://home.comcast.net/~chris.s/hittite-ref.html>

powerful. He served as Alalus' cup bearer for nine years and then defeated him, dispatching him to under the earth. He took his seat on the throne and had Kumarbis as his cupbearer. Likewise, after nine years Kumarbis rebelled, chased Anus - who fled in the sky like a bird, and bit off and swallowed his phallus. In this act Anus had some revenge by impregnating Kumarbis with the Storm-god, the Aranzahus (Tigris) river, and Tasmisus. He then hid himself in heaven. He advised the Storm-god on the places where he might exit Kumarbis. After the Storm-god's birth, they plotted to destroy Kumarbis and, with his other children, apparently succeeded."

Notice that there are nine years that Anus (Uranus) served Alalus (forgotten god) as cupbearer before overthrowing him. Also Kumarbis (Kronos) served Anus for nine years before overthrowing him. Thus there are really nine generations to this story and those nine generations are reflected in the nine years between the revolutions in the Hittite story. This connects with the mythology of the Indo-Europeans that the tree Yaddrasil has nine of every species hanging as a sacrifice within it. Nine is a sacred number to the Indo-Europeans as it is for the Chinese as well. Nine is a special number because it is the natural generator of all the other numbers according to B. Fuller in Synergetics.

We notice that there are four generations of gods and five generations of men. In all the generations Socrates says that their names are correct names. But each of them are extraordinary births that lead to wrong actions that result in a curse that haunts the generations. But the result of the crimes is ultimately the creation of the first court in Athens presided over by Apollo and Athena. And as we know all the trouble with sycophants and sophists have come from the democratization of the civil courts which eventually grew out of the five courts that deal with homicides. So it is interesting that there are five homicide courts and five generations of men.

Our hypothesis is this. The separations between the gods represent the kinds of Being.

Emergences		
	Ultra Being	<i>un-handed</i>
Separation	Alalu	God forgotten in oblivion

	Wild Being	<i>out-of-hand</i>
Aphrodite from Sea	Uranus/Gaia	100handed/Cyclops
	Hyper Being	<i>in-hand</i>
Delphi Stone	Chronos/Rhea	Titans give fire to man in revenge (Prometheus)
	Process Being	<i>ready-to-hand</i>
Oaktrees Oracles	Zeus/Hera	Kills off Men
	Pure Being	<i>present-at-hand</i>
Law	Men	Kill each other (Homocide)

As we are going back in the genealogy of the gods we are going up the levels of the kinds of Being in terms of the differences between the gods.

Then the kinds of Being represent the relations between the kinds of courts¹⁰ that deal with homicide in ancient Athens.

<u>Kind of Being</u>	<u>Court</u>	<u>Use</u>
Ultra	Prytaeum	Try the animal or the inanimate things that cause death
Wild	Phreatto	Trial of ship for exile
Hyper	Delphinium	Confess to killing but claim that it was legal like Oresetes
Process	Palladium	Unintentional homicide and killing of slave, metic, or foreigner
Pure	Areophaghs	Premeditated murder – will defendant be put to death

¹⁰ <http://www.crystalinks.com/greeklaw.html>

beings	Dikastic	Other civil suits
--------	----------	-------------------

The genealogy of five men represent some of the most egregious possible kinds of killing:

- Tantalus kills son Pelops.
- Pelops kills fathers inlaw
- Atreus kills children of lover of wife
- Agamemnon kills daughter
- Wife kills Agamemnon with help of lover
- Orestes kills mother

The genealogy of the five men related to the myth of Cadamas¹¹ and Harmonia. These are like the five men of earth that sprung up from the dragons teeth. There were many more of them but when they sprung up Cadamas threw a stone between them and they all killed each other until only five were left. These five helped Cadamas found a city, Thebes. The point is that these men are from the dragon. The line from Tantalus to Orestes are similarly tainted by their homicides, but this line also ends with the creation of the law courts of Athens by Drako which is a name for a dragon. Those laws of Drako was said to be written in blood because they were so cruel and extreme, the only punishment for the lightest of offenses being death.

So under this hypothesis the kinds of Being distinguish the gods from each other and from men. The men are at the ontic level, and the Gods are between the higher levels of Being. Each god has an emergent event associated with it and also a side effect. The emergent event associated with Alalu is the separation between heaven and earth, but the side effect is that this god was forgotten among the Greeks. Uranus has the emergent event of the arising of Aphrodite but has the side effect of the creation of the hundred-handed ones and the Cyclopes as the first creation, after which the Titans were created. Cronos has the emergent event of the production of the stone of Delphi that he spits up after being fed it by Zeus. The side effect is that men get fire from

¹¹ <http://www.loggia.com/myth/cadmus.html>

Prometheus as a revenge against the Olympians by the Titans. The emergent event of Zeus is his oracles by the oak trees at Dodona¹². The emergent event associated with men is the creation of Law, so that the Gods no longer need be consulted, but the side effect is that men kill men as we see in the line of Tantalus to Orestes who like the men of earth slay each other for no reason, which is their curse of nihilism. Because they kill each other there needs to be homicide courts. And when these courts become general courts as they eventually do and also when they become democratic courts then we have the phenomena of sycophancy and sophism. And those citizens like Socrates who attempt to challenge the Sophists are branded with the same brush because the citizens cannot tell the difference between the Philosopher and the Sophist.

(8) He, (Zeus) as we are informed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus¹³, rightly so called (apo tou oran ta ano) from looking upwards; which, as philosophers tell us, is the way to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore correct.

"Uranus, also known as Ouranos, was the embodiment of the sky or heavens, and known as the god of the sky. He was the first son of Gaia (the earth) and he also became her husband. According to Hesiod, their children included the Titans: six sons (Oceanus, Coeus, Crius, Hyperion, Iapetus and Cronus) and six daughters (Theia, Rhea, Themis, Mnemosyne, Phoebe and Tethys). There were other offspring: the Cyclopes, (who were named Brontes, Steropes and Arges and were later known as "one eyed giants"), and also the three monsters known as the Hecatonchires, who each had one hundred hands and fifty heads. Their names were Briareus, Cottus and Gyes. Other offspring of Uranus and Gaia were the Erinyes, who were spirits of punishment and goddesses of vengeance. The Erinyes avenged wrongs which were done to family, especially murder within a family. After Uranus had been castrated, his blood fell to earth (Gaia) and conceived the Giants. These were of monstrous appearance and had great strength. Similarly, in some versions Aphrodite is believed to have risen from the foam created by the sex organs of Uranus after they were thrown into the sea by his son Cronus.

Uranus was aghast by the sight of his offspring, the Cyclopes and the Hecatoncheires. (In a differing version Uranus was frightened of their great strength and the fact that they could easily depose him). He hid them away in Tartarus (the bowels of the earth) inside Gaia, causing her intense pain. The discomfort became so great that she asked her youngest son, Cronus, to castrate his father, as this would cease his fertility and put an end to more monstrous offspring. To accomplish this deed Gaia made an adamant sickle, which she gave to Cronus. That

¹² <http://www.pantheon.org/articles/d/dodona.html>

¹³ <http://www.pantheon.org/articles/u/uranus.html>

night Uranus came to lay with Gaia. And as the sky god drew close, Cronus struck with the sickle and cut off Uranus's genitals. From the blood that fell from the open wound were born nymphs and giants, and when Cronus threw the severed genitals into the sea a white foam appeared. From this foam Aphrodite the goddess of love and desire was born.

A slightly differing version tells of Uranus being so vast that he could cover Mother Earth (Gaia) and easily take advantage of her fruitfulness, but Gaia tired of her exuberant fertility and begged her sons to free her from the excessive embrace of Uranus. All refused except Cronus. Armed with a sickle he castrated Uranus, and the blood which fell from the mutilation gave birth to the Erinyes (Furies), the Giants and the Meliae (Nymphs of the manna ash trees). And when Cronus threw the sickle into the sea the island of Corfu, home of the Phaeacians, sprang up.

After Uranus (the sky) had been emasculated, the sky separated from Gaia (the earth) and Cronus became king of the gods. Later, Zeus (the son of Cronus) deposed his father and became the supreme god of the Greek Pantheon."

Uranus' name means looking upwards. Presumably back toward Alalu and not toward Gaia. We know that as Anu, Uranus was the cup bearer for Alalu for nine years in the Hittite story. As such it could be that he was looking up toward the higher position of Alalu with envy, and that is what led to his killing Alalu and sending him under the earth. Right here the succession of wrongs begins which plays itself out in the succession of the gods as well as that of men. Murder is the theme throughout the story.

But what Socrates suggests is that Uranus is looking up at the non-dual sources of things and thus has a pure mind. So there is a discrepancy between the story and the etymology. This discrepancy goes throughout the etymologies. Socrates is giving us euphemisms. He is blandly suggesting that the Gods are responding to the Forms and is not commenting on their actions nor the emergent results or the side effects. But there mere mention of their names leads us to look at the backstory and consider it. And that backstory is one where it is hard to see how they could be looking up at the good and doing such bad things. They are not making non-nihilistic distinctions on the basis of their seeing the good or the other non-duals. Rather they are going against nature in all cases. So this is a story of degeneration that contrasts markedly with the etymologies we are offered. Socrates

cannot have been sacrilegious because here where he has the chance he paints over the shortcoming of the gods and says that they are rightly named with very poor etymological euphemisms. Plato's point is that he is falsely accused of sacrilege. However, on the other hand just bringing up their names causes us to consider their stories and this informs our understanding of the dialogue.

(7) Which is the fact; for this is the meaning of his father's name: Kronos¹⁴ quasi Koros (Choreo, to sweep), not in the sense of a youth, but signifying to chatharon chai acheraton tou nou, the pure and garnished mind (sc. apo tou chorein).

"Cronus, the son of Uranus and Gaia and the youngest of the twelve Titans. His wife was also one of the Titans, since he married his sister Rhea. Their offspring were Demeter, Hestia, Hera, Hades, Poseidon and Zeus.

It is written that Uranus, who in one version, hid his children away in the bowels of the earth (Tartarus) as he was aghast at the sight of them, in reality he was fearful of their great strength and power. Gaia found her offspring uncomfortable and also painful and when she found the discomfort too much to bear she hatched a plan, which was to end the passions of Uranus, so no more offspring could be produced and that would be the ending of her hurt. But to achieve this she required the help from one of her children. She asked them all, but only her youngest child Cronus would heed her call. To help Cronus accomplish his task Gaia gave him a adamantine sickle to serve as his weapon.

Cronus lay in wait hidden from view, and when Uranus came to lay with Gaia Cronus struck. With one mighty blow from the sickle Cronus severed the genitals from Uranus' body. From the blood which fell to the earth (Gaia) where born the Erinyes (Furies), the Giants and also the Meliae (Nymphs of the manna ash trees). In other versions Aphrodite was born from the foam created from the sex organs of Uranus, after they had been thrown into the sea by Cronus.

Once Cronus had castrated Uranus, he and his wife Rhea took the throne. Under their power a time of harmony and prosperity began, which became known as the "Golden Age"; a time when it was said that people lived without greed or violence, and without toil or the need for laws. But not all was well for Cronus, as it was fated that he would be overthrown by one of his own children. To prevent this from happening he began to swallow his newborn, taking them at birth then swallowing them whole, retaining them inside his own body where they could do him no harm.

Rhea did not like the thoughts of losing all her children, and with the help of Gaia she saved Zeus from this fate. Rhea wrapped a stone in Zeus' swaddling clothes which Cronus took and immediately swallowed thinking it was the child. Gaia and Rhea's plan worked well and the baby Zeus was taken to Crete, and there, in a cave on Mount

¹⁴ <http://www.pantheon.org/articles/c/cronus.html>

Dicte, the divine goat Amaltheia suckled and raised the infant Zeus. When Zeus had grown into a young man he returned to his fathers domain, and with the help of Gaia, compelled Cronus to regurgitate the five children he had previously swallowed. (In some versions Zeus received help from Metis who gave Cronus an emetic potion, which made him vomit up Zeus' brothers and sisters). Zeus led the revolt against his father and the dynasty of the Titans, defeated and then banished them.

The Romans compared Cronus with their Saturn, who was to the Romans a corn god. This is from the association of the "Golden Age". In Athens on the 12th day of the month Hekatombaion a festival was held in honour of Cronus, which was known as the "Kronia". It was a celebration of the harvest. In art, Cronus was depicted carrying a sickle used to gather the harvest, but this was also the weapon he used to castrate his father.

The name may derive from the verb kreno, which means 'to exercise sway', 'to reign over', 'to govern.'

Here we get the distinction between Socrates' etymology and the modern one. Here again Socrates gives us a euphemism saying that the meaning of the name of Kronos is to sweep away as in purifying the mind. Rather other more modern etymologists would say that it means to exercise sway over and to govern instead. Kronos is associated with time. The devouring of his children represents the action of time which eats up all the children eventually. The purification of the mind also suggests action. Kronos is no longer looking up at the Good but is instead purifying himself. It is as if the etymologies are an attempt to purify the gods. If the gods had been engaged in these activities then their fates and ours would have been different Socrates seems to be saying.

(6) The name of Zeus¹⁵, who is his alleged father, has also an excellent meaning, although hard to be understood, because really like a sentence, which is divided into two parts, for some call him Zena, and use the one half, and others who use the other half call him Dia; the two together signify the nature of the God, and the business of a name, as we were saying, is to express the nature. For there is none who is more the author of life to us and to all, than the lord and king of all. Wherefore we are right in calling him Zena and Dia, which are one name, although divided, meaning the God through whom all creatures always have life (di on zen aei pasi tois zosin uparchei). There is an irreverence, at first sight, in calling him son of Cronos (who is a proverb for stupidity), and we might rather expect Zeus to be the child of a mighty intellect.

"Zeus, the youngest son of Cronus and Rhea, he was the supreme ruler of Mount Olympus and of the Pantheon of gods who resided there. Being the supreme ruler he

upheld law, justice and morals, and this made him the spiritual leader of both gods and men. Zeus was a celestial god, and originally worshiped as a weather god by the Greek tribes. These people came southward from the Balkans circa 2100 BCE. He has always been associated as being a weather god, as his main attribute is the thunderbolt, he controlled thunder, lightning and rain. Theocritus wrote circa 265 BCE: "sometimes Zeus is clear, sometimes he rains". He is also known to have caused thunderstorms. In Homer's epic poem the Iliad he sent thunderstorms against his enemies. The name Zeus is related to the Greek word dios, meaning "bright". His other attributes as well as lightning were the scepter, the eagle and his aegis (this was the goat-skin of Amaltheia).

Before the abolition of monarchies, Zeus was protector of the king and his family. Once the age of Greek kings faded into democracy he became chief judge and peacemaker, but most importantly civic god. He brought peace in place of violence, Hesiod (circa 700 BCE) describes Zeus as "the lord of justice", Zeus was also known as "Kosmetas" (orderer), "Soter" (savior), "Polieos" (overseer of the polis - city) and also "Eleutherios" (guarantor of political freedoms). His duties in this role were to maintain the laws, protect suppliants, to summon festivals and to give prophecies (his oldest and most famous oracle was at Dodona, in Epirus -northwestern Greece). As the supreme deity Zeus oversaw the conduct of civilized life. But the "father of gods and men" as Homer calls him, has many mythological tales.

His most famous was told by Hesiod in his Theogony, of how Zeus usurped the kingdom of the immortals from his father. This mythological tale of Zeus' struggle against the Titans (Titanomachy) had been caused by Cronus, after he had been warned that one of his children would depose him. Cronus knowing the consequences, as he had overthrown his father Uranus. To prevent this from happening Cronus swallowed his newborn children Hestia, Demeter, Hera, Hades and Poseidon, but his wife Rhea (who was also his sister) and Gaia her mother, wrapped a stone in swaddling clothes in place of the infant Zeus. Cronus thinking it was the newborn baby swallowed the stone. Meanwhile Rhea had her baby taken to Crete, and there, in a cave on Mount Dicta, the divine goat Amaltheia suckled and raised the infant Zeus.

When Zeus had grown into a young man he returned to his fathers domain, and with the help of Gaia, compelled Cronus to regurgitate the five children he had previously swallowed (in some versions Zeus received help from Metis who gave Cronus an emetic potion, which made him vomit up Zeus' brothers and sisters). However, Zeus led the revolt against his father and the dynasty of the Titans, defeated and then banished them. Once Zeus had control, he and his brothers divided the universe between them: Zeus gaining the heavens, Poseidon the sea and Hades the underworld. Zeus had to defend his heavenly kingdom. The three separate assaults were from the offspring of Gaia: they were the Gigantes, Typhon (Zeus fought them with his thunder-bolt and aegis) and the twin brothers who were called the Aloadae. The latter tried to gain access to the heavens by stacking Mount Ossa on top of Mount Olympus, and Mount Pelion on top of Mount Ossa, but the twins still failed in their attempt to overthrow Zeus. As he did with the Titans, Zeus banished them all to "Tartarus", which is the lowest region on earth, lower than the underworld.

According to legend, Metis, the goddess of prudence, was the first love of Zeus. At first she tried in vain to escape his

¹⁵ <http://www.pantheon.org/articles/z/zeus.html>

advances, but in the end succumbed to his endeavor, and from their union Athena was conceived. Gaia warned Zeus that Metis would bear a daughter, whose son would overthrow him. On hearing this Zeus swallowed Metis, the reason for this was to continue to carry the child through to the birth himself. Hera (his wife and sister) was outraged and very jealous of her husband's affair, also of his ability to give birth without female participation. To spite Zeus she gave birth to Hephaestus parthenogenetically (without being fertilized) and it was Hephaestus who, when the time came, split open the head of Zeus, from which Athena emerged fully armed.

Zeus had many offspring; his wife Hera bore him Ares, Hephaestus, Hebe and Eileithyia, but Zeus had numerous liaisons with both goddesses and mortals. He either raped them, or used devious means to seduce the unsuspecting maidens. His union with Leto (meaning the hidden one) brought forth the twins Apollo and Artemis. Once again Hera showed her jealousy by forcing Leto to roam the earth in search of a place to give birth, as Hera had stopped her from gaining shelter on terra-firma or at sea. The only place she could go was to the isle of Delos in the middle of the Aegean, the reason being that Delos was, as legend states, a floating island. One legend says that Aphrodite was the daughter of Zeus and Dione

Besides deities, he also fathered many mortals. In some of his human liaisons Zeus used devious disguises. When he seduced the Spartan queen Leda, he transformed himself into a beautiful swan, and from the egg which Leda produced, two sets of twins were born: Castor and Polydeuces and Clytemnestra and Helen of Troy. He visited princess Danae as a shower of gold, and from this union the hero Perseus was born. He abducted the Phoenician princess Europa, disguised as a bull, then carried her on his back to the island of Crete where she bore three sons: Minos, Rhadamanthys and Sarpedon. Zeus also took as a lover the Trojan prince Ganymede. He was abducted by an eagle sent by Zeus (some legends believe it was Zeus disguised as an eagle). The prince was taken to Mount Olympus, where he became Zeus' cup-bearer. Zeus also used his charm and unprecedented power to seduce those he wanted, so when Zeus promised Semele that he would reveal himself in all his splendor, in order to seduce her, the union produced Dionysus, but she was destroyed when Zeus appeared as thunder and lightning. Themis, the goddess of justice bore the three Horae, goddesses of the seasons to Zeus, and also the three Moirae, known as the Fates. When Zeus had an affair with Mnemosyne, he coupled with her for nine consecutive nights, which produced nine daughters, who became known as the Muses. They entertained their father and the other gods as a celestial choir on Mount Olympus. They became deities of intellectual pursuits. Also the three Charites or Graces were born from Zeus and Eurynome. From all his children Zeus gave man all he needed to live life in an ordered and moral way.

Zeus had many Temples and festivals in his honor, the most famous of his sanctuaries being Olympia, the magnificent "Temple of Zeus", which held the gold and ivory statue of the enthroned Zeus, sculpted by Phidias and hailed as one of the "Seven Wonders of the Ancient World". Also the Olympic Games were held in his honor. The Nemean Games, which were held every two years, were to honor Zeus. There were numerous festivals throughout Greece: in Athens they celebrated the marriage of Zeus and Hera with the Theogamia (or Gamelia). The celebrations were many: in all, Zeus had more than 150 epithets, each one being celebrated in his honor.

In art, Zeus was usually portrayed as bearded, middle aged but with a youthful figure. He would look very regal and imposing. Artists always tried to reproduce the power of Zeus in their work, usually by giving him a pose as he is about to throw his bolt of lightning. There are many statues of Zeus, but without doubt the Artemisium Zeus is the most magnificent. It was previously thought to be Poseidon, and can be seen in the Athens National Archaeological Museum."

In Zeus's name we have a split between Zena and Dia. Zena relates to life and Dia to Kingship. So he is the king of the gods through which everyone has life. Thus Zeus looks down toward creation as Uranus looks upward, and Kronos purifies his mind which is a process that is in the middle between these two directions of looking. Kronos being the elder has the stain of senility. But Socrates again corrects that by saying that Zeus must have been born from a great mind. Notice the emphasis on the mind not the body.

(5) Every one would agree that the name of Tantalus¹⁶ is rightly given and in accordance with nature, if the traditions about him are true.

[Her.] And what are the traditions?

[Soc.] Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in his life- last of all, came the utter ruin of his country; and after his death he had the stone suspended (talanteia) over his head in the world below- all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You might imagine that some person who wanted to call him Talantatos (the most weighted down by misfortune), disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus; and into this form, by some accident of tradition, it has actually been transmuted.

"Tantalus was the son of Zeus and was the king of Sipylos. He was uniquely favored among mortals since he was invited to share the food of the gods. However, he abused the guest-host relationship and was punished by being "tantalized" with hunger and thirst in Tartarus: he was immersed up to his neck in water, but when he bent to drink, it all drained away; luscious fruit hung on trees above him, but when he reached for it the winds blew the branches beyond his reach.

There are differing stories about what Tantalus' crime was. One account says that he tried to share the divine ambrosia with other mortals, and thus aroused the ire of the gods. A more famous account says that he invited the gods to a banquet and served them the dismembered body of his own son, Pelops; when the gods discovered the trick, they punished Tantalus and restored Pelops to life, replacing with ivory a part of the shoulder which had been eaten by Demeter.

Tantalus' family was an ill-fated one. His daughter, Niobe, lost all her children and was turned to stone. His son,

¹⁶ <http://www.pantheon.org/articles/t/tantalus.html>

Pelops, was murdered, cooked, and restored to life. His grandsons, Atreus and Thyestes, struggled for power, and Atreus committed a variation of Tantalus' cannibalistic trick with Thyestes' children. His great-grandson, Agamemnon, was murdered by another great-grandson, Aegisthus, who was in turn killed by a great-great-grandson, Orestes."

Tantalus is the first of the men, but is a man who consorts with the Gods, shares food with them, perhaps steals the food or tries to get them to eat inappropriate food, i.e. cannibalism. This suggests cannibalism on the part of Tantalus. But we have the son brought back to life, a popular theme in later Western epics, such as with Abraham and Christ. Notice that as soon as we switch from the Gods to men then the names more closely resemble the actual situation of the mythology, not to mention the fate of Dionysus and Odin.

(4) And I think that Pelops¹⁷ is also named appropriately; for, as the name implies, he is rightly called Pelops who sees what is near only (o ta pelas oron).

[Her.] How so?

[Soc.] Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or foresight of all the evil which the murder of Myrtilus would entail upon his whole race in remote ages; he saw only what was at hand and immediate,- Or in other words, pelas (near), in his eagerness to win Hippodamia by all means for his bride.

"Pelops was the son of Tantalus and the grandson of Zeus. When he was a boy, his father cut him into pieces, stewed his flesh in a cauldron, and served him as a feast for the gods. The gods detected the trick and restored Pelops to life; a single piece of his shoulder had been eaten by Demeter, and this they replaced with ivory. After his restoration, Pelops was an even more beautiful young man than before; Poseidon fell in love with him and gave him a winged chariot.

Later, Pelops wooed Hippodameia, the daughter of King Oenomaus of Pisa. Oenomaus had decreed that any suitor might carry Hippodameia off, but that he himself would pursue them and would kill anyone he was able to overtake. He had already killed twelve or thirteen suitors this way. However Pelops (or Hippodameia in some accounts) persuaded Oenomaus' charioteer, Myrtilus, to remove the linchpins from the king's chariot; Oenomaus was thrown from the vehicle, became entangled in the reins, and was dragged to his death. Pelops then killed Myrtilus by throwing him into the sea, either because he had tried to rape Hippodameia or because Pelops resented sharing the credit for success in the chariot race. Myrtilus, as he was dying, cursed the house of Pelops, and this curse blighted the lives of Pelops' sons (Atreus and Thyestes), and his grandsons (Agamemnon and Aegisthus).

Pelops subdued the area of Greece which became known as the Peloponnesus, and then returned to rule Oenomaus' kingdom in Pisa. During the time of the Trojan

¹⁷ <http://www.pantheon.org/articles/p/pelops.html>

War, the Greeks brought his bones to Troy because of a prophecy that only by doing so could they conquer the city."

Pelops now we see as a man of earth. He sees only what is near, as we hear in the Sophist about the man of earth, the man born of earth like the ones from the dragons teeth. First man is weighed down and next he only sees what is near.

(3) I also think that Atreus¹⁸ is rightly called; for his murder of Chrysippus and his exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and destructive to his reputation- the name is a little altered and disguised so as not to be intelligible to every one, but to the etymologist there is no difficulty in seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as ateiros the stubborn, or as atrestos the fearless, or as ateros the destructive one, the name is perfectly correct in every point of view.

"Atreus, king of Mycene, was the son of Pelops and the father of Agamemnon and Menelaus. He was the grandson of Tantalus, whose family was blighted by curses from the gods for five generations. The misfortunes of the house of Atreus were favorite subjects for Greek tragic dramatists.

Atreus vowed to sacrifice the finest animal in his flock to Artemis; however, when he discovered a golden lamb in the flock, he reneged on the promise and hid the lamb away. At the same time his wife, Aerope, was having an affair with his brother, Thyestes. Aerope secretly gave the lamb to Thyestes, and Thyestes then got Atreus to agree that the possessor of the golden lamb should be king. Thyestes produced the lamb and seized the throne.

Atreus was determined to be king again. On the advice of Hermes, he got Thyestes to agree to yield the throne when the sun ran backwards in its course. Zeus then made the sun set in the east, and Atreus became king once more, banishing Thyestes for good measure.

Later, Atreus learned of his wife's adultery and decided to seek revenge for it. He invited Thyestes to return and be reconciled with him. He killed Thyestes' sons, cut them up, and cooked everything except their hands and feet. Then he served this meat at a banquet in Thyestes' honor. After Thyestes had finished eating, Atreus produced the hands and feet, taunted his brother with them, and banished him once more.

At this point, Thyestes was the one intent on revenge. An oracle advised him that his revenge would be successful if he fathered a son by his own daughter. He did so, and named the son Aegisthus. When Aegisthus grew to manhood, he killed Atreus and restored his father to the throne.

The curse continued long after Atreus' death. Thyestes was banished for a third and final time when Agamemnon, the son of Atreus, returned and seized the throne. Later on, Aegisthus seduced Agamemnon's wife, Clytemnestra,

¹⁸ <http://www.pantheon.org/articles/a/atreus.html>

and the two of them murdered Agamemnon when he returned from the Trojan War. Agamemnon's children, Orestes and Electra, then plotted and carried out the murder of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra, thus continuing the curse into yet another generation."

Atreus is stubborn, fearless and destructive. He is the result of the man weighed down and the man of earth.

(2) [Soc.] And his father's name is also according to nature.

[Her.] Clearly.

[Soc.] Yes, for as his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon¹⁹ (admirable for remaining) is one who is patient and persevering in the accomplishment of his resolves, and by his virtue crowns them; and his continuance at Troy with all the vast army is a proof of that admirable endurance in him which is signified by the name Agamemnon.

"Agamemnon was the son of Atreus and the brother of Menelaus. He was the king of either Mycenae (in Homer) or of Argos (in some later accounts), and was the leader of the Greek forces during the Trojan War. He married Clytemnestra and had several children by her, including Orestes, Electra, and Iphigenia.

When the Greeks sailed for Troy, their fleet was trapped by unfavorable winds at Aulis. The seer Calchas revealed that their misfortune was due to Agamemnon, who had boasted that he equalled Artemis in hunting; the winds would only change if Agamemnon's daughter Iphigenia was sacrificed. Agamemnon reluctantly agreed to the sacrifice, but Artemis herself whisked Iphigenia away from the altar and substituted a deer in her place.

During the siege of Troy, Agamemnon offended the greatest of the Greek warriors, Achilles, when he took the girl Briseis from him. Achilles' anger with Agamemnon furnished the mainspring of the plot in the Iliad. After the sack of Troy, Agamemnon acquired Cassandra, the daughter of King Priam, as his concubine, and took her home with him to Greece.

Agamemnon had an unhappy homecoming. He was either blown off course and landed in the country of Aegisthos, or he came home to his own land to find Aegisthus waiting for him. In either case, Aegisthus had become the lover of Clytemnestra, and the two together murdered Agamemnon and Cassandra shortly after their arrival. Aegisthus and Clytemnestra then ruled Agamemnon's kingdom, but were eventually killed by Agamemnon's son, Orestes (or by Orestes and Electra in some accounts). The homecoming of Agamemnon and its aftermath were favorite subjects for Greek tragedy."

Agamemnon as one who endures is yet another euphemism. But what he endures could be the weight of the curse that is passed down from Tantalus through the generations as a Miasma. What he endures is the result of the Miasma in his family line.

¹⁹ <http://www.pantheon.org/articles/a/agamemnon.html>

(1) [Soc.] Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes²⁰ (the man of the mountains) who appears to be rightly called; whether chance gave the name, or perhaps some poet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness and mountain wildness of his hero's nature.

[Her.] That is very likely, Socrates.

"Orestes was the son of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra and the brother of Electra. When his father returned from the Trojan War, he was murdered by Clytemnestra and her lover, Aegisthus. Orestes, who was quite young at the time, went into exile and swore to get revenge. After he reached adulthood, he returned home secretly and, plotting with his sister Electra, contrived the murder of both Aegisthus and Clytemnestra. As a consequence of his deed, Orestes was tormented by the Erinyes, or Furies, who followed him everywhere he went. The Erinyes only stopped hounding him when he sought judgement for his crime at the Aeropagus in Athens, and was acquitted."

Orestes is the wild man of the mountain, who is followed by the Furies, who were begotten by Uranus when he was castrated. But this very wildness is what gives rise to the court of Athens where the furies become the Eumenides. In that court we find that women have no part in reproduction, and we get Athena breaking the tie of men and voting against women, for Orestes as Apollo holds court and makes his plea to save Orestes. Yet it was for the killing of the mother that Orestes is chased by the Furies. His father killed his daughter and he killed his mother in revenge for this mother's killing of his father. This is the utterly dysfunctional family. This is a wild humanity without law, even family morals that bind the family together and prevents the killing of parents and children. The sequence begins with a father killing his son, and ends with the son killing the mother. After the first killing of the son, then there is the killings of the wife's father and the wife's lover's sons. Then the Father kills the daughter, the wife kills the father, and the son kills the mother. Notice in all this killing the son does not kill the father nor does the daughter kill the father. It is Oedipus that this other outrage is played out of the son killing the father and marrying the mother rather than killing her. In Greek myth all the possible permutations of killing are played out. And that is why the courts are needed to decide these cases. And these courts correspond to the meta-levels of

²⁰ <http://www.pantheon.org/articles/o/orestes.html>

Being.

The Areopahs court is the clearest in as much as it is about intentional homicide. Thus the Plan to kill is what is deemed equivalent to Pure Being. Then we get the Palladium where unintentional or lesser murder of the non-citizen is tried. It is exactly the intention that is withdrawn in our relation to the ready-to-hand which supports our goals as the slave obeys the master. Supporting the goals by the human technology of slavery, is seen as being the same as unintentional murder. Thus Process Being is this secondary hidden structure that produces class within the Athenian society by the withdrawal of pure status or pure intention that the Athenian citizens share. The Delphinium is the court where one goes when one has killed someone but sees it as legal. Thus here the law is supporting murder as seen in the case of Orestes, where there is a conflict in the laws and where one chooses to support the father even if it means killing the mother, and that this is justified because the mother has no real part in the birth of the child other than carrying the fetus. So Hyper Being is exactly what happens when the law both supports and denies killing and the person has to make the choice as to which part of the law to follow. Then the courts become even crazier. There is the Phreatto court where exiles can answer to charges by defending themselves just off shore. This is another example of chiasm as one is caught between two penalties, and the way to handle that is to reach within speaking distance but not set foot on shore. This court was near the sea which stands in for the infinite stretches of existence beyond Being. And finally there is the Prytaeum where inanimate things and animals were tried for killing people. This appearance of externality that seems so foreign to us is precisely the appearance of Ultra Being within the society of Athens, as they filed charges against things and animals as well as people. Thus we see the ritualistic aspect of the court, which is to purge the city of miasmas and ill omened things other than people as well. And it is precisely on this last court that symbolically represents Ultra Being that we want to focus our

attention. At the outer reaches of the court system it covered things and animals who committed homicide as well. And thus the things are schematized, i.e. they are submitted to the rule of law, and recognized as being capable of harm. This trial of the things and animals, in fact all creation, is what stands in for schematization and dimensionalization. For Schematization is rooted in Wild Being. Although it appears at the first meta-level of Being within the chiasm, because the chiasm is between two duals it is as if from the beginning there is an interaction between the externalities of the two duals in all the chiasms. Thus ultra Being which is the surface tension of externality of the projection interacts with the noumena in each case of schematization. That is the trial of the things, and it proves Protagoras' point that man takes it upon himself to give the measure of all things, because he takes it upon himself to take all things to court in the case where they commit homicide. All things are subject to the court of Athens. And this is how we find that the court system is implicated in schematization. The rhetorical modes exercised in the court system in forensic rhetoric is the way language is used to take the things to task for their crimes. But to be pointed out they must first appear in spacetime/timspace as dimensionalized and then organized by the emergent organization of the schemas, after that we decide with the dialectician what kind of thing they are and we help with their naming, and through the naming we create the references of meaning that bear on the things. But schematization must come first, it is by schematization the things can appear within the court to be tried. Only with schematization can we point to this finite thing as the accused.

=====

(9) If I could remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more conclusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors of the Gods,- then I might have seen whether this wisdom, which has come to me all in an instant, I know not whence, will or will not hold good to the end.

[Her.] You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly inspired, and to be uttering oracles.

Socrates is indeed uttering oracles. But not on the surface of his speech. Rather he is allowing the recall of the genealogy of the men and gods to speak for him. His euphemistic etymologies notwithstanding this is in fact a powerful part of the speech which appeals to mythology by naming the mightiest of gods and men and shows that passed down through that line is a miasm of great proportions that has decreed their fate. The names just do not measure up to the stories. Yet, Socrates by casting his euphemistic names, which become more realistic when he reaches the names of men, shows that the bitter truth of the inheritance and the curse that flows down through the generations cannot be dispelled by the archeology of the names. It is a false prophecy and an over optimism on the part of Socrates to think he captures much of the depth of the names of the people themselves that ring through our ears today almost as they must have rung in his own days. The recounting of the extremes of human experience and the experience of the gods goes far beyond what some facile similitude of sounds can give us. This is of course the one dracma lecture, not the thirty dracma lecture. The fact that the wisdom came to Socrates all of an instant should be our sign not to take it seriously. Anything new Socrates is against fundamentally. It is only remembered things that are significant. So here we see the struggle between the neologism and the superficial archeology of names and the mythos itself. Of course the mythos must win this struggle because of its depth, which cannot be reached by mere words about words.

[Soc.] Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration from the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long lecture which commenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his wisdom and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken possession of my soul, and to-day I shall let his superhuman power work and finish the investigation of names- that will be the way; but to-morrow, if you are so disposed, we will conjure him away, and make a purgation of him, if we can only find some priest or sophist who is skilled in purifications of this sort.

[Her.] With all my heart; for am very curious to hear the rest of the enquiry about names.

So the false inspiration is blamed on

Euthyphro who is out to condemn his father. This banalization of the names of the forefathers is similar to that condemnation of the father carried on by Euthyphro. The next day the Sophist dialogue recounts the conversation with the stranger who will act as a healer and banish this over enthusiasm and fascination with the newly coined similitudes of words.